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Sense and Symbolism:
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© 2006 P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen

“The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions
and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of the victories of the
Righteous Cause, we have still not found Peace or Security.”
— Winston Churchill

E

urope, as identity and union, has undergone an extraordinary transformation since the end of Cold War. In recent history, much of this remarkable
change has only accelerated, both with the expansion of membership in the European Union (EU), a growing independence in terms of foreign policy, and an
emerging recognition (particularly with the “no” votes of both France and the
Netherlands in 2005 regarding support for the European Constitution) that disagreements about Europe’s future and identity are inevitable. The cultural and
political philosopher J. Peter Burgess has aptly summarized, nonetheless, a
major European shift—especially regarding the concept of security:
In New & Old Wars Mary Kaldor argues that a new type of organized violence
has developed, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, as one aspect of the globalized
era. The new wars are, according to Kaldor, characterized by a blurring of the
distinctions between war, organized crime, and wide-scale violations of human
rights. In contrast to the geo-political goals of earlier wars, the new wars are
about identity politics. Kaldor argues that in the context of globalization, ideological and territorial cleavages of an earlier era have increasingly been supplanted by an emerging political cleavage between cosmopolitanism, based on
inclusive, universalist multicultural values, and the politics of particularistic
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identities. The evolution of the European Defense and Security Policy has
evolved in the shadow of this mutation. A European culture with dubious historical reputation for cosmopolitanism is being thrust upon the global stage at the
very moment when its geopolitical concepts are poised on the precipice of desuetude. With Solana’s Thessaloniki Summit document “A Secure Europe in a
Better World” the European community of values is being transformed into a security community.1

Reflecting this recognition, the document A Secure Europe in a Better
World—most commonly known as the European Security Strategy—stands in
somewhat notable contrast to the 17 September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.2 Specifically, the European Union strategy
emphasizes the notion of cooperative engagement, relying on the strength of
450 million members and the recognition that no one country—perhaps in direct contrast to the US national strategy—can “go it alone.” Although the concept of “sharing hegemony” between the United States and Europe seems
immensely sensible, reality equally dictates that this sharing is unlikely to occur in the near future.3
Collectively, documents and policies regarding the development of
a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) emphasize the necessity for Europe to have the ability for independent action. Especially with
the 2001 “Helsinki Declaration” and the call for a 60,000-member European
Rapid Reaction Force, Europe has recognized a need for independence from
powerful allies (such as the United States) and from powerful alliances (such
as NATO).4 Moreover, the evolution of the European defense “responsibility”
has focused on the so-called Petersberg tasks, which concentrate on humanitarian and crisis response capabilities that nonetheless fall short of a fullscale intervention force with the ability to sustain combat over prolonged
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time. As drawn from Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union, and
originally stated in the (now defunct) Western European Union Petersberg
Declaration of June 1992, these responsibilities entail “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”5
The purpose of this article is not expressly to detail the chronology,
conceptual development, and evolution of European defense policy. Yet, with
the publication of the European Security Strategy in 2003 and with the subsequent 2004 publication of A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, the EU has
declared inherent security values in both promoting the rights of nation-states
and in protecting the rights of individual citizens. The EU also has provided a
proposed force planning structure to support these values. Before considering aspects of these strategic documents and force structure implications, we
shall offer a brief synopsis of human security and why it might prove significant as a security agenda item.

Approaching Human Security:
From Philosophical Roots to Varying Definitions
In the classical sense, security—from the Latin securitas—refers to
tranquility and freedom from care, or what Cicero termed the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends. Notably, numerous governmental
and international reports that focus on the terms “freedom from fear” and
“freedom from want” emphasize a pluralist notion that security is a basic, and
elemental, need.
From this rather general—and quite European—understanding of
security, the human security concept centers on a concentration on the individual (rather than the state) and that individual’s right to physical safety, basic freedoms, and access to sustainable prosperity.6 In ethical terms, human
security is both a “system” and a systemic practice that promotes and sustains
stability, security, and progressive integration of individuals within their relationships to their states, societies, and regions.
Clearly, one could find little to argue with in terms of advocating
such a system and practice. There are problems, nonetheless. On the one
hand, ethics collectively involves codes of values, morality, religion, history,
tradition, and even language. Such an ethical system that enforces, as it were,
human security inevitably collides with conflicting values—which are not
synchronous or accepted by all individuals, states, societies, or regions. Pragmatically, enforcement of these values, or the perceived right to even make
these judgments, is contested.
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On the other hand, in the once widely accepted, and still dominant,
realist understanding, the state was the sole guarantor of security. Indeed, security extended downward from nations to individuals; conversely, the stable
state extended upward in its relationship to other states to influence the security of the international system. This broadly characterizes what is known as
the anarchic order.
Yet individual security, stemming from the liberal thought of the Enlightenment, was also considered both a unique and collective good.7 The responsibility, however, for the guarantee of the individual good—under any
security rubric—has never been obvious. Moreover, the right of states to protect themselves under the rubric of “national security” and through traditional
instruments of power (political, economic, and especially military) has never
been directly, or sufficiently, challenged. Indeed, that such a challenge is absent despite recent catastrophic failures in state-based security protection,
(such as Rwanda, Northern Uganda, and Darfur) where the state either has
been unwilling or unable to protect, or even has been antagonistic against,
its citizens, demonstrates the questionable faith ascribed to this tenuous security mandate.
Increasingly, faced with large-scale vulnerability and growing questions as to the viability of a solely state-based and militaristic security apparatus,
decisionmakers will need to focus on a broad—and broadening—understanding
of the meaning of security. Regarding human security specifically, the 1994
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report attempted to recognize a
conceptual shift that needed to take place:
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security
of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in
foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has
been related to nation-states more than people. . . . Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For
many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime [or terrorism], social conflict, political repression,
and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the Cold War receding,
one can see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.8

In 2003, the UN Commission on Human Security expanded this concept to include protection for peoples suffering through violent conflict, for those who
are on the move whether out of migration or in refugee status, for those in
post-conflict situations, and for protecting and improving conditions of poverty, health, and knowledge.9
To be blunt, there are specific reasons for those intending to affect
the security debate to employ (perhaps even unintentional) strategies in terms
88
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of “threats” and causal, seemingly inevitable, linkages to violence: doing so
both makes the topic accessible for decisionmakers and provides a basis for
determining present and future policy. Most often such decisionmakers conceive of security concepts only in power-dominant, state-centric mindsets.
There is hazard, nevertheless, of adding the term “security” to emerging concerns that affect the lives of many individuals—and many regions.
This hazard is clearly present in the use of the term “human security.” And although some might argue that the term has roots in a neo-Marxist
critique of the 1970s, one can reasonably illustrate that human security is a
principle embedded in Enlightenment Liberalism. And, while all proponents
agree on the necessity of individual safety, some have insisted that such protection could best be achieved only through the security of the state.10 The
state, traditionally, acts as protector from both external and internal threats.
For Thomas Hobbes, the classic state-centered realist, an individual’s insecurity sprang from a life that was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short.”11 The state protected the individual from threats, whether these threats
came at the hands of a local thief or from an invading army. For this protection, the citizen essentially relinquished individual rights to the state, as the
state was the sole protector. Thus, in contrast to principles embedded in documents such as the American Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution, security always trumped liberty. Clearly an in an age where terrorism
and extremist violence are constant challenges, and where legislation such as
the USA Patriot Act and individual surveillance continue unabated in what
are considered “open” societies, the conflict between collective/individual
security and individual liberty remains. Indeed, Benjamin Franklin’s adage
remains an uncomfortable dilemma even today: those who give up their personal liberty for increased security deserve neither.
In more recent history, human security has been bifurcated by both
broad and narrow definitions. A broad approach to human security is based
on the concept of “freedom from want” and the narrow approach on “freedom from fear.” While these categorizations are, admittedly, rather simplistic in their labels, they do prove useful in illustrating how different advocates of human security follow quite different paths in pushing for human
security action.
The Broad Definition
The broad human security conceptual approach, for example, largely
draws from the work of the United Nations Development Program, as well as
subsequent work of both the UN-appointed Human Security Commission, the
Japanese government, and a host of academics.12 In this “freedom from want”
approach, the previously referenced 1994 UNDP report argues that freedom
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“The broad conceptualization of human security
is revolutionary—and quite different from a
traditional, state-centric view of security.”

from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression (which require
long-term planning and development investment), as well as the protection
from sudden disasters (which require often immediate interventions of support
from outside agents), requires action under the security rubric. Thus, the
UNDP offers seven human security components:13
l Economic security — the threat is poverty.
l Food security — the threat is hunger and famine.
l Health security — the threat is injury and disease.
l Environmental security — the threat is pollution, environmental
degradation, and resource depletion.
l Personal security — the threat involves various forms of violence.
l Community security — the threat is to the integrity of cultures.
l Political security — the threat is political repression.
In this conceptual approach to human security,14 the overarching focus is on, in the words of the Human Security Commission, protecting the “vital core” of the individual from critical and pervasive threats. Even as the
above components fracture human security into separate identities, the core
remains on the human citizen and his or her ability to live without dramatic
hindrance to one’s personal well-being, whatever the cause. In pragmatic
ways, the broad conceptualization of human security is revolutionary—and
quite different from a traditional, state-centric view of security. Most notably,
perhaps, it brings what are traditionally considered “development” or “humanitarian” considerations, into the security discourse. This of course has
profound implications.
The Narrow Definition
The so-called “Canadian Approach” represents another end of the
spectrum of human security—the narrower conception.15 By relying primarily on violent threats, the Canadian Approach separates human security from
the much broader and already established field of international development.
The Canadian government acknowledges the UNDP conception as a phase in
the development of human security, but envisions a much more focused defi90
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nition, one centered on violent threats, as an instrument of policy.16 The Canadian definition, therefore, largely restricts the parameters of human security
to violent threats against the individual. This can come from a vast array of
threats, including the drug trade, land mines, ethnic discord, state failure, and
small-arms trafficking. Indeed, the Human Security Centre (part of the Liu
Institute for Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia) clearly expresses the purposes of this approach:
Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts have increasingly taken place
within, and not between, states. National security remains important, but in a
world in which war between states is the rare exception, and many more people
are killed by their own governments than by foreign armies, the concept of “human security” has been gaining greater recognition.
Unlike traditional concepts of security, which focus on defending borders from
external military threats, human security is concerned with the security of individuals.
For some proponents of human security, the key threat is violence; for others
the threat agenda is much broader, embracing hunger, disease, and natural disasters. Largely for pragmatic reasons, the Human Security Centre has adopted
the narrower concept of human security that focuses on protecting individuals
and communities from violence.17

This narrower focus on human security emphasizes the more immediate necessity for intervention capability rather than long-term strategic
planning and investing for sustainable and secure development. Given the
choice of being broad and ideal, or being narrow and operable by focusing on
violence, only a small component of human vulnerability, the Canadian government has clearly sided with pragmatism.
Despite clear differences, both human security approaches rely on
noncoercive methods as much as on having the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly. Some of these noncoercive measures include security sector
reform, sustainable economic development, preventive diplomacy, postconflict statebuilding, and mediation and negotiation efforts by parties external to conflicts.
Human security, nonetheless, may rest uncomfortably on the horns
of a dilemma. The required focus should perhaps not be on either a narrow or
broad definition—but on both. Indeed, for example, protection from human
rights violations is only one component of ensuring human security. Individuals also need protection from poverty, disasters, conflict, and disease. Put
another way, protection from gross violations of human rights is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition of human security. Further, human security itself
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“There is a dark side of this proposition, of course:
that the ‘responsibility to protect’ also means
the ‘right to intervene.’”

could also be said to be a necessary but not sufficient precondition for human
development. If human security could cover the most urgent threats, development would then address societal well-being. Moreover, human rights should
be seen as one of many components of human security. Just as some, but not
all, environmental disasters cross the threshold of severity to become human
security threats, so too do some, but not all, human rights abuses.18
Ultimately, while the effort to promote human security in the arena of
“high politics” on the part of the Canadian and Norwegian governments since
the 1990s is well known, there is a tempting sense of proselytizing righteousness as well. Such so-called “middle power” states, after all, can exercise significant moral clout by emphasizing that the rights of the individual are at least
as important as protecting the territorial and sovereign integrity of the state. Yet
when larger powers, particularly those with significant militaries (such as the
United States or the United Kingdom) advocate similar positions, it is their
overwhelming power that is recognized, respected, and resented.
On the one hand, what is perceived as the “moral clout” of the middle
power is sensed as “hegemony unbridled” when it is emphasized in an attempted similar fashion by major powers. On the other hand, when actions
taken in the name, or in the principled following, of human security do occur,
they often are inextricably linked to issues that are embedded in the more traditional concepts of “national security” and protection of the state. Idealism
thus becomes enmeshed in realism; actions taken on behalf of the powerless
are determined only by the powerful.19
Undoubtedly, increasing numbers now speak out on behalf of what
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has
termed the “responsibility to protect”: the responsibility of some agency or
state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution
such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign
states owe to their citizens. But there is a dark side of this proposition, of
course: that the “responsibility to protect” also means the “right to intervene.” In the topology of power, dominant states will likely continue to intervene at the time and place of their choosing.
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Although it is unclear how permanent or deep the damage was from
the 2003 US-European trans-Atlantic rift over intervention in Iraq, there are
warning signals. As Robert Kagan notes, a crisis of legitimacy has emerged,
with roots in the Balkan interventions of the 1990s:
The fact remains that the Kosovo war was illegal, and not only because it lacked
Security Council authorization: Serbia had not committed any aggression
against another state but was slaughtering its own ethnic Albanian population.
The intervention therefore violated the sovereign equality of all nations, a cardinal principle of the UN Charter and the bedrock principle of international law
for centuries. During the Kosovo conflict, Henry Kissinger warned that “the
abrupt abandonment of the concept of national sovereignty” risked unmooring
the world from any notion of order, legal or otherwise. Many Europeans rejected this complaint at the time. Back then . . . before the Iraq war . . . they did
not seem to believe that international legitimacy resided exclusively with the
Security Council, or in the UN Charter, or even in traditional principles of international law. Instead they believed in the legitimacy of their common postmodern moral values.20

In 2003, during the dispute over Iraq, those postmodern values did not seem
to be universally shared or even understood. Yet it is against this backdrop
that the European Union chose in late 2004 to address a context and a justification for incorporating human security as a philosophy, if not a complete
doctrine, worth considering. How advocates of human security reconcile
these undeniable conceptual and normative challenges will define the future
of this young but potentially significant concept. A recent EU effort directly
takes on critics of human security, and in many ways for the first time moves
the concept from a hit-or-miss tool of advocacy to a real challenge to the traditional security paradigm.

Europe Incorporates
Human Security
In September 2004, the European Union released A Human Security
Doctrine for Europe, which detailed the scope, organization, and intent that the
EU “should build its security policy on a ‘human security doctrine,’ aimed at
protecting individuals through law-enforcement, humanitarian assistance with
the occasional use of force.”21 Taking into account the need for complementarities in civil and military operations for EU missions in the Balkans, in the
great lakes region of sub-Saharan Africa, and in the South Caucasus, the document proposed the development of a civil-military force of 15,000 personnel, a
third of which would be civilian professionals who would support crisismanagement operations.
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Concerning this proposal, two notable aspects arise. First, the convenor of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities was Mary Kaldor, author of the widely acknowledged work New and Old Wars: Organized
Violence in a Global Era. According to Kaldor,
Europeans cannot be secure while millions of people live in intolerable insecurity. Where people live with lawlessness, poverty, exclusivist ideologies, and
daily violence, there is fertile ground for human rights violations, criminal networks, and terrorism. Conflict regions export or transport hard drugs and guns
to the European Union. That is why a contribution to global human security is
now the most realistic security policy for Europe.22

The document does not shy away from expressing high ambitions for the European Union and its capability to project force—even on a global scale.
While some observers remain skeptical that the EU often pronounces lofty
ambitions without the ability to integrate and organize or to support such a
global force, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe may be the most direct
document to date to so openly declare Europe’s responsibility to act independently and, if necessary, to act beyond the borders of Europe. Indeed,
these responsibilities are clearly stated: “A human security approach for the
European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not only on the defence of the Union’s borders, as
was the security approach of nation-states.”23
This rationale, however, falls victim to one of the difficulties of any
potential human security based foreign policy—namely, how direct a link
must be made between vulnerability abroad and EU security. Once the human
security doctrine is applied to people outside of the EU’s political responsibility, must they justify intervention on national security grounds? If so, there
are significant difficulties with relying solely on the “terrorist breeding
ground” argument in guiding an entire foreign policy. If not, they will have to
move beyond direct causal links to a more nuanced argument connecting suffering abroad to security at home.
The document also presents a decidedly narrow definition for human security. By emphasizing “law-enforcement . . . with the occasional use
of force,” the focus on human security remains strictly limited. However, the
report does state that in extreme circumstances, a human security intervention may be needed against the more egregious nonviolent threats, thus incorporating some aspects of the broader human security conceptualization,
though notably using the type of threshold suggested above as a limiting
mechanism. Generally, however, while the term “human security” is still
evolving, the EU “doctrine” seems to intentionally limit itself to a focus on violence and how to stop it.24 Yet with this limiting focus, the EU human secu94
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“Traditional applications of military security are
often necessary, but they also certainly
are not sufficient as instruments for
achieving real security.”

rity doctrine emphasizes legal frameworks and institutions (such as the
International Criminal Court—which the United States has refused to recognize) and developing specific guidelines and criteria that could authorize intervention exclusive of UN Security Council authorization.25 While stressing
the need to prevent “gross human rights violations,” the declaration is quite
specific in other ways regarding norms, expectations, and the responsible
commitments of states to their citizens:
The [Human Security] doctrine [for Europe] comprises three elements:
l

A set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that
apply to both ends and means. These principles are: the primacy of human
rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force. The
report puts particular emphasis on the bottom-up approach; on communication,
consultation, dialogue, and partnership with the local population in order to improve early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilization of local support, implementation, and sustainability.

l

A “Human Security Response Force,” initially composed of 15,000 men and
women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (police, legal experts, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). The Force would
be drawn from dedicated troops and civilian capabilities already made available
by member states as well as a proposed “Human Security Volunteer Service.”

l

A new legal framework to govern both decisions to intervene and operations
on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host states, the domestic law of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights
law, and international humanitarian law.26

By detailing “capabilities” in the form of force structure and organization—especially the EU Human Security Response Force of 15,000 personnel (roughly the size of an army division)—the doctrine notably comprises
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both military and civilian specialists, able to deploy to locales as disparate as
Macedonia, Kosovo, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The force itself
would be tiered, drawing first on staff and headquarters capabilities from
Brussels, with a secondary force of 5,000 personnel able to deploy in ten days.
The final tier of 5,000 personnel would remain at a lower level of readiness but
would periodically train and exercise together.27
The force would also draw from a professional core, with a civilian
component of doctors and other medical personnel, legal specialists, human
rights monitors, and those who straddle the military/police divide, such as
carabinieri or gendarmerie. The final aspect of this organization would be the
Human Security Volunteer Service.28 All members would be expected to be culturally aware, multinational, attuned to the multiple dimensions of conflict and
intervention, and imbued with a specific, dedicated ethos. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private corporations might also constitute part of the
Human Security Volunteer Service.
In short, this EU Human Security Force would represent an ambitious, even breathtaking, initiative to respond to crisis challenges. By responding simply to direct threats, the doctrine itself might be nothing more
than a well-thought-through intervention force proposal; itself, it would remain little more than a response force to react to violence and its aftermath.
However, by clearly distinguishing the roles of civic, humanitarian, and military responses to this violence, the proposed “doctrine” is taking a significant
step away from the historic traditional security response. Yet the doctrine
nonetheless bears a direct lineage with the European Security Strategy, and it
takes from that strategy a focus on direct threats: terrorism, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organized crime.29

Unpacking Security Strategy:
The European and US Examples
One might (correctly) argue that little consideration is given in the
EU human security doctrine regarding the broader conception of human security. Yet the example of why it is important to recognize these broader human
security necessities—and act on them—is deeply embedded in the European
Security Strategy itself. Notably, nowhere in the EU strategy—or in the US
National Security Strategy, for that matter—do the words “human security”
appear. Yet the concept’s principles, including the need to address and solve
longer-term development issues that could actually sustain and resolve the
security dilemma of many in nations and regions in crisis, are omnipresent.
Indeed, the strategy’s full title presents the claim of A Secure Europe in a
96
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Better World, thus stressing the need for the EU to “get real” and act on its responsibility and in its role as global actor:
Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90 percent of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of
conflict.
In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering
and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the
world’s population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. Forty-five million die every
year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. . . .
Security is a precondition for development. . . .
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats
is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. . . . Regional conflicts need political solutions,
but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict
phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well
equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.30

The US National Security Strategy of 2002, which emphasized the
“non-negotiable demand of human dignity” and the reduction (if not eradication) of poverty, also leans toward the broader conception of human security
through long-term development, free trade and free markets, and the practice
of good governance and policies. However, the national interest in tackling
vulnerability abroad is argued in notably moralistic terms, differing significantly from the “securitization” of these issues in the EU “doctrine.” And although the specific organization and deployment of military forces is never
detailed in official Bush Administration documents and declarations, the sentiment to respect freedom is unquestionable:
There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent
and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom. . . . The best hope for peace
in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. . . . Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law
and the protection of minorities. And when the soul of a nation finally speaks,
the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from
our own. America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.31
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The US strategy document and declaration do not detail how military forces
uphold human security; rather, the emphasis remains on the good practice of
governments and on development as issues that receive priority.32
What distinguishes the EU strategy and subsequent human security
doctrine are: (1) establishing a clear “objective” for “stronger international
society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based order”33;
(2) a basic recognition that “establishing the rule of law and protecting human
rights are the best means of strengthening the international order”34; and (3) a
detailed operational force proposal for protecting human security. Taken collectively, these documents implicitly recognize the fragile web of security,
and that no single instrument—no matter how seemingly powerful in its application—is sufficient to address new and emerging security issues. The old
cliché that describes the “blowback” that otherwise often occurs is an apt reminder: “If all you have is a hammer, then every problem begins to look like a
nail.” Surely, as the interventions in Somalia and in the Balkans illustrate, traditional applications of military security are often necessary, but they also
certainly are not sufficient as instruments for achieving real security.

A Global Security Commitment
While sounding the death knell for NATO and the Transatlantic relationship is hardly a certainty, many believe this has become a more likely possibility in recent years. Charles Kupchan, a former National Security Council
member, has been quite clear in his views on the security dilemma:
The Atlantic alliance appears poised for demise. Its founder and primary patron, the United States, is losing interest in the alliance, resulting in a military
pact that is hollowing out and of diminishing geopolitical relevance. . . . Europe’s security order is thus in the process of becoming much more European
and much less Atlantic.35

At one point in history (the Cold War), the “hard” security map took
precedence over all other mental maps—and NATO was the key security linkage. Clearly, that security map is shifting in front of our eyes. In response to
that shift, nonetheless, the European Union, perhaps paradoxically, both distanced itself from the United States in creating specific security documents
yet simultaneously made clear overtures to the United States in recognizing
enduring security linkages:
The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the
United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single
country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own. . . . The transat-
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lantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and
the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim
should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.36

Today, when we speak of the business of security—for the individual, the state, the community, and for regions—we find us ourselves mired in
a complex web of seemingly endless contradictions. Perhaps one of the most
overlooked aspects of the broadening future security architecture lies in how
Greater Europe has attempted to address common aspects of security and interests, rather than the exclusive self-interests of states. By doing so, there has
occurred a gradual shift toward what can only be called “global security.”
NATO expansion, in other words, is not the only security measure being tested in the evolving Europe. To the contrary, other players in the institutional map of Europe have gained in influence and significance: the EU
(obviously), the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, as well as a number of sub-regional associations.
The Partnership for Peace, for example, once seen as a kind of halfway house
for NATO membership, is now recognized to be a more fluid and dynamic process to encourage associated members to participate in multiple peacekeeping
and peace maintenance operations, whether in Europe or out-of-area. The Partnership for Peace, in its modest way, helped pave the security map for American and coalition operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. What is happening
in Europe, whether one refers to it as “cooperative security” or “comprehensive security,” has implications far beyond the region itself in this century. In
essence, a grand experiment in security architecture is taking place. It is not
clear that this experiment is doomed to failure.
Moreover, there are geographic as well as conceptual reasons why
Europe has attempted to approach these new security challenges directly. In the
broadest sense, the new map of Greater Europe includes Turkey, the Ukraine,
the Russian Federation, and perhaps even Christian Armenia and Georgia and
Muslim Azerbaijan. Greater Europe will therefore inevitably fold into the geographies of North Africa and the Middle East as well. The conflict and the
blending of these represent both a new symbolic geography and a symbolic security for Greater Europe. As Maria Todorova states it, “Europe ends where
politicians want it to end.”37 Inevitably, the mental maps that decisionmakers
use have everything to do with how and where they draw the line.
Ultimately, all nations and all alliances are far from having what Michael O’Hanlon and P. W. Singer term a global intervention capability on behalf of “humanitarian transformation.”38 Granted, the threat of mass-casualty
terrorism now exists anytime, anywhere, and states and regions are responding
differently to this challenge. Yet the global community today also faces many
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of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian
crises. While Europe and the European Union are perhaps no closer than anyone else to addressing how best to solve these challenges, Europe has at least
acknowledged the need to think, act, and organize differently to prepare for the
future. Specifically, the EU security strategy stresses the necessity of “effective multilateralism” and often acknowledges the crucial leadership roles of
the United States in making this multilateralism both coherent and effective.39
Essentially, states and regions, in a globalized context, can no longer
afford to solely emphasize national security issues without recognizing that
abstract concepts such as values, norms, and expectations also influence both
choices and outcomes. In its most recent declarations, the European Union
appears to have incorporated these recognitions as a basic ethos in approaching security. Yet, as the blatant international failures in 1994 in Rwanda and
ongoing in Darfur and the Eastern Congo illustrate—through a collective international decision to do nothing—human security is hardly proving to be
the trump card of choice in decisions by states to intervene in the affairs of
other states, particularly where it involves violating traditionally respected
rights of sovereignty. In other words, taken to extreme forms, both human security and national security can be conceptually approached as antagonistic
rather than convergent identities. Each, in its exclusive recognition, remains
problematic.
In moving toward an evolving commitment to global security, the
European Union has demonstrated some new, useful thinking. As a force proposal, and as a natural extension of the European security strategy, the EU human security doctrine does not address all problematic issues—and it raises,
internally, a few problematics of its own in terms of feasibility. It remains unclear, for example, how the EU is truly broadening its capabilities to respond
with an overarching human security policy—other than addressing the necessity to act, to be ready to intervene when necessary, and to have the organization and structure to do it.40 Equally, how to deal with strategic challenges
(such as long-term investment and planning) or pragmatic factors (such as the
question of how unarmed civilian specialists would themselves be vulnerable
in intervention situations) remains, as yet, unanswered. But at least the dialogue has begun.
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